The 1956 Revolution: The Picture Becomes Clearer

The events of October 1956 have remained a cause of contention for 34 years now. The diametrically opposed positions still stir up emotions. Why is this? Why has there been no clear consensus after all this time? 

One reason has been the lack of access to and analysis of contemporary documents. The so-called specialist literature published up until last summer [i.e., 1990] was not the result of scholarly inquiry. Rather, it was nothing more than an exercise in apologetics – supported by the requisite distortions and slander – for a system that had been restored through armed force. Thus, there could be no convergence between the official account and personal appraisals.

Previous official propaganda spoke about an escalation in demands, that whereas such demands were legitimate at the beginning, they became increasingly radical and illegitimate, and that it was this that led to the counterrevolution. What is your view on this?

Let’s consider one example of this line of reasoning. According to Gyurkó László [a Hungarian communist journalist and author of a book on 1956], there were so many versions of the demands that he didn’t even know which one to consider authentic. In the end, he simply accepted the one that appeared in the [Hungarian communist] press at that time. In reality, however, it is possible to track very precisely how the demands, for example, put forward by the [Budapest] Technical University students developed and changed. There is no substantive difference between the first, truly improvised, ten-point list of demands, the so-called Topolino points [named after the 1938 FIAT Topolino driven by Prof. István Jankovich, who helped compile them], and the “final” sixteen-point version. The only exception concerns the article in Szabad Ifjúság [Free Youth] that Gyurkó cited. This version omitted the most “shocking” demands, namely, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the demand for a multiparty system, but did so without the consent of the university students. In other words, all the main demands were already “finalized” before eight in the evening on October 22. The protestors then tried to announce the original 16 points on Hungary Radio on the evening of the 23rd, but the two points mentioned earlier were not accepted there either, although the increasingly boisterous crowd insisted on them. Later events would see a substantial addition to this program, namely, the demand that the ÁVH [the Soviet secret police] be dissolved, but this was the result of the siege of the Hungary Radio building and the massacre committed on Kossuth Square on “Bloody Thursday” [October 25]. 

What transpired at the Hungary Radio building comprises one of the most controversial elements of these events.     

The Communist leaders, who were initially inclined to disperse the demonstrators by force, refrained from doing so in the early afternoon. Events, however, escalated into an uprising when the ÁVH opened fire on the people gathered outside the radio station. The crowd, which had been waiting to hear the 16 points to be read over the air uncensored, was initially unarmed. The situation became more tense when both the crowd and ÁVH received reinforcements. Army units were also called in. But while the ÁVH snuck into the radio building through a back entrance, the soldiers – unaware of this – tried to reach the main entrance by forcing their way through the crowd. We know that one group of officers, upon reaching the closed gate, carried out a straightforward assault to get inside the building to defend it. But we also know of soldiers who either defected to the crowd or handed their weapons over to the insurgents. And we know that one Hungarian army officer was shot by the ÁVH. One thing is certain: the [ÁVH] defenders initially shot at unarmed people, and only after did the enraged crowd obtain weapons.

How did Soviet troops get involved in suppressing the initial demonstrations? Who summoned them?

This can only be made clear once the Soviet archives are opened. However, anyone who thinks that Soviet troops had to be called in fundamentally misunderstands the nature of Hungarian-Soviet relations. Whether [Chairman of the Council of Ministers] Imre Nagy or [Party Secretary Ernő] Gerő considered the idea of summoning the Soviet army, it nevertheless appeared at once, but the decision was made in Moscow, not Budapest. The Soviet leadership had been watching events in Hungary and Poland with increasing concern and were prepared to use armed force to prevent what they considered unwelcome developments in both countries. The forces stationed here [in Hungary] were already on alert on October 23 and set off towards Pest in the afternoon. Soviet military advisor [Lieutenant-General Mikhail] Tikhonov informed the Hungarian Minister of Defense [István] Bata about this prior to anything happening at the radio station. This was clearly not an independent action on the part of the military but the result of a political decision. 

How could the Soviet leadership have anticipated such events when their Hungarian counterparts proved so unprepared?

We must distinguish between preparations and concrete action. Preparations may have begun weeks earlier, but concrete action did not begin until it became obvious that a demonstration would occur in Budapest. They probably intended to prevent the events from taking a radical turn through a relatively peaceful show of force. Of course, their intentions could only have been relatively peaceful, since shooting always takes place and there are always deaths. The situation was similar to that of the East Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953.

One of the most controversial issues of October is what happened on Kossuth Square on “Bloody Thursday,” October 25. Who could have fired the shots? Could there have been insurgents on the roofs of the buildings?

[Kossuth Square] was a very tightly and closely secured area since the party headquarters, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and a building occupied by the ÁVH were all located in the vicinity of the Parliament. We know that insurgents tried to break into the ÁVH building on the 24th, and as the authorities had thwarted this attempt so they were prepared to prevent anything similar. It is simply inconceivable that armed insurgents could have gotten in there.

Could there have been a provocation?

This is also a possibility. We cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet leadership had already taken steps towards a political solution after the unsuccessful military intervention. Naturally, this did not accord with everyone’s interests. At the exact moment when gunfire rang out, some 150 meters from Kossuth Square, [Soviet Politburo members Mikhail] Suslov and [Anastas] Mikoyan were at the Hungarian Communist Party headquarters, where they had removed Ernő Gerő from the party leadership (!) and replaced him with János Kádár.

What were the chances of a military solution at that point?

The central leadership was divided for a long time, although on the 26th they still favored a military solution, with [Géza] Losonczy and [Ferenc] Donáth being the most vocal opponents. A military committee, headed by [Political Committee member] Antal Apró, was appointed by the party leadership on the 23rd to deal with a military takeover. Under the leadership of Lajos Fehér [another member of the military committee], the officers from the State Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior [politikai főcsoportfőnökség] developed a plan for a military dictatorship. Their plan hinged on the Hungarian Third Army Corps commanded by [General] Lajos Gyurkó. They wanted to gain Imre Nagy’s support but were also prepared to exclude him if they failed. They took the plan, which was militarily unfeasible and politically almost laughable, from the Ministry of Defense to the party headquarters in the early hours of the 27th, where they were only able to discuss it with [Central Committee member] Zoltán Szántó. Szántó refused to support it under any circumstances and insisted that Imre Nagy also be informed in detail. By the time Nagy had awakened, however, the plan for a dictatorship had already been shelved. This is perhaps indicative of how serious it had actually been.

The mass protests were accompanied by atrocities. The bloodiest took place during the siege of the party headquarters on Köztársaság [Republic] Square on October 30. What accounts for the extreme swing in the nature of these occurrences?

We condemn lynching, of course, but let us not forget that one day after the bloodbath in front of the Parliament, on the 26th, they opened fire on protestors in Miskolc and Mosonmagyaróvár as well. Ten people died in the former place and 59 in the latter, with some accounts claiming more than a hundred. Hatred towards the ÁVH intensified among the population, with the incensed mob lynching ÁVH officers in both locations. The party building on Republic Square had an AVH guard dressed in police uniforms after the organization was dissolved. The subsequent siege of the building may have been triggered by civilians in the square noticing the arrival of trucks carrying police uniforms. To verify this, a small unit of armed national guards [nemzetőr] entered the building with their ID cards. However, some of them were taken prisoner by the ÁVH after a brief firefight. The siege of the party headquarters then commenced to free them. Up until now, these events have been discussed in a distorted and one-sided manner without any mention of what had led to them. There is no doubt that the pendulum had swung sharply by this time. Nevertheless, the public mood was not one of bloodlust; in fact, a sense of calm had already taken hold by this time. Unjustifiable terror was already condemned by the public, the press, and even the armed groups at that time. Incidentally, compared to other similar historical revolutionary events, we can say that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was among the less bloody. A flood of filth broke to the surface here too but not nearly to the extent as was later suggested.

How did [Communist MP] Imre Mező die?

According to the official version, Imre Mező and his colleagues, who had left the [Communist Party headquarters] building carrying a white flag, were shot at point-blank range, with Mező himself shot in the stomach. Another version has it that they were shot from behind by ÁVH officers who refused to surrender. I must confess I do not have any clear information to judge which of these two versions is correct.

Did the declaration of neutrality trigger Soviet aggression?

The idea of neutrality had already been raised on the 23rd and was also included in the decisions taken by the central leadership [of the Hungarian Workers Party] on the 28th. Its announcement on November 1 seemed such a given that Suslov and Mikoyan, who were in discussions with the Hungarian leaders, also approved it. They also chose a delegation to go to Warsaw, whose task it was to clarify the details of the withdrawal [from the Warsaw Pact]. Thus, this was a move that had been agreed upon with the Soviets. But by the time Suslov and his colleagues returned to Moscow, the official Soviet position had changed. By the 30th they had already begun replacing their troops and were flooding the country with military forces. It was already clear on the first [of November] that preparations were under way for a major military operation. It was this fact – along with public pressure, of course – that prompted the Nagy government to hasten events and withdraw from the military bloc, thus eliminating the legal basis for Soviet military intervention. It was a desperate move to be sure, but it can’t be said to have made the events more radical or counterrevolutionary. In October 1956, a revolution broke out in Hungary, and in November the Soviet army set out to crush it. From 1849 onward, repeated aggression on the part of the great powers has prevented the Hungarian people from taking control of their own destiny.   

László Varga (1948–2016) was a Hungarian historian and archivist. A graduate of Eötvös Loránd University, Varga was a member of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1975–1978), a member of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (1980–1985), the director (1991–1999) and later chief archivist (1999–2004) of the Budapest Metropolitan Archives, and scientific director of the Holocaust Memorial Center (2004–2005).

(translated by John Puckett and Andrea Thürmer)