Myths and Misconceptions – Hungary’s Participation in the Second World War

On the Hungarian declaration of war

It has been a persistent claim for many decades that when László Bárdossy, Hungary’s prime minister and foreign minister, declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941, he did so without a legal basis. However, when one considers the events of June 26/27, 1941, it can be asserted that this claim is not true. What happened on those two days would fundamentally alter Hungary’s destiny.

On June 26, 1941, the town of Kassa (Košice) was bombed by three unidentified aircraft – later determined to be Soviet – while a confirmed Soviet aircraft attacked a Hungarian express train between Kőrösmező (Yasinya) and Budapest in the Rahó–Tiszaborkút (Rakhiv–Kvasy) area, in what is now the Transcarpathia region of western Ukraine. The two attacks left several dozen dead and injured and resulted in considerable material damage.  

Two key figures of Hungary’s military leadership – Lieutenant General of Infantry, Henrik Werth, chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd, and Reserve Lieutenant General Quartermaster Károly Bartha de Dálnokfalva, recipient of the Order of Vitez and minister of defense – informed the head of state, Regent Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya, about the Soviet attacks, who gave de facto orders for an immediate “counterattack.” The rights granted to the regent as head of state under Articles I and XVII of the Act of 1920 afforded Horthy the opportunity to make such a decision, and he did so. The law read: “In the event of an imminent danger, however, the regent may − provided that all Hungarian ministries assume responsibility and that subsequent approval of Parliament is sought without delay − order the deployment of the army outside the country’s borders.”

At the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers following the head of state’s decision, a meeting that László Bárdossy and Károly Bartha attended already knowing the regent’s decision (and of which there is evidence that the two extant records are inauthentic), the prime minister and foreign minister – László Bárdossy – and the defense minister - Károly Bartha – both stated that “following the unjustified and unprovoked Soviet Russian attack upon Hungary and having thus initiated a state of war against us, we also declare ourselves to be in a state of war.”

According to the two questionable records of the Council of Ministers’ meeting, the majority of those present – except for the minister of the interior, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, who considered the announcement premature and opposed it – agreed with the defense minister’s statement and with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bárdossy, who declared: “As a result of repeated, unjustified, and unprovoked attacks by the Soviet air force against Hungarian territory over the course of the day, Hungary considers herself to be in a state of war with the Soviet Union.” 

Bárdossy informed the Lower House of Parliament about the statements made at the Council of Ministers the following day, stating: “Honored House (Hear! Hear!) I would like to make a very brief announcement. The speaker of the House has used the appropriate terms in condemning the Soviets’ illegal and inexcusable attack. The Royal Hungarian government declares that as a result of the attacks, a state of war now exists between Hungary and the Soviet Union.”

The announcement was greeted with cheers and applause, with the same reaction occurring on July 4, 1941, when Bárdossy announced the declaration of war in the Upper House. However, by the time the announcement was made in the Upper House, the troops of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd were already advancing into Soviet territory, and Adolf Hitler had already received Miklós Horthy’s letter of June 28, 1941, in which he wrote, among other things, that “when the Soviet-Russian air force made repeated duplicitous bombing raids on Hungarian territory, I declared that Hungary was in a state of war with Russia.”

In the event, the declaration of war was neither legal nor illegal. The procedure was indeed legal according to the laws of the time; nevertheless, political responsibility weighed heavily on the decision-makers and continues to do so to this day. And yet the issues of political responsibility and criminal responsibility are not identical in this case; judgments of posterity and those of law need not coincide.

The Don catastrophe

When considering Hungarian involvement in the Second World War, much has been written about the defeat of the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army on the Don River in January-February 1943, the losses in men and material, and the tragedy of the forced labor service battalions. In most cases, figures are proffered that have no relation to the facts and which are usually devoid of any sources. And yet, more up-to-date figures have been known for fifteen to twenty years now and have appeared in numerous publications, but this has not been enough to remove now-entrenched falsehoods from public perception and education.

The Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army

Hungarian historical works, especially those of a popular nature, cite “mythical numbers” when describing the losses suffered by the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army. Claims that some 200,000 Hungarian soldiers and labor conscripts were lost in the “slaughterhouse” at Voronezh – victims of Hungarian government policy – are often encountered in the literature, despite the fact that no Hungarian military units were located at the town.

Most authors on the subject have been unconcerned about the fact that more reliable figures –give or take a few hundred persons – have been available for more than three decades now, which refute the claim of 200,000 men lost.

When considering the period covering the often-mentioned Soviet breakthrough, a document signed by Brigadier General Gyula Kovács, the former chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army (designated as the Hungarian Occupation Forces Command after May 1, 1943), the total losses suffered by the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army in 1943 were as follows:

	January 1, 1943	April 6, 1943
Ration strength	194,334	100,818
On leave (est.)	10,000	7500
Total	204,344	108,318
Losses (est.)		96,016
Losses – causes
Wounded and sick transported home		28,044
Prisoners of war (according to Soviet radio reports)		26,000
Repatriated and prisoners of war (total)		54,044
Dead and missing in action		41,972

According to figures compiled at the time, the total losses suffered by the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army between January and April 1943, including killed, missing, and captured, numbered roughly 68,000 men, while the number of wounded sent home to recuperate amounted to 28,044. 

If we include the losses suffered during the fighting in 1942, which came to roughly 30,000 men killed, missing, wounded, and captured, then the total losses incurred by the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army between April 11, 1942, and April 6, 1943 – including losses among labor conscripts  – can be roughly estimated at around 125,000 men, of whom some 60-65,000 were killed or declared missing. Of those taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1942-1943, very few survived to return home to Hungary in the latter half of the 1940s. 

Labor service battalions

Starting in April 1941, persons of Jewish origin in the Royal Hungarian Honvéd were restricted to unarmed military duties and labor service. The following table displays the number of conscripts obliged to perform labor service in the Royal Hungarian Honvéd between April 1941 and June 1942. These figures also include a large number of non-Hungarians, such as Romanians, Serbs, and Ruthenians (Rusyns).

April 1941	9,629
May 1941	18,834
June 1941	17,257
July 1941	14,560
August 1941	14,892
September 1941	12,184
October 1941	7,227
November 1941	4,022
December 1941	2,324
January 1942	2,002
February 1942	2,186
March 1942	2,997
April 1942	8,161
May 1942	13,808
June 1942	24,375

The figure cited for June 1942 also includes labor conscripts serving both with the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army and with rear units.

During this period, or more precisely, between June 26, 1941 (the date of the alleged Soviet bombing of Kassa and the opening of hostilities with Soviet Russia) and December 31, 1942, 1628 conscripts serving in Hungarian labor service battalions died or were killed, 160 were reported missing, 319 were wounded, and 42 were taken prisoner.  

The losses suffered among the labor conscripts increased substantially following the Soviet offensive against the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army in January-February 1943. According to the figures compiled at the time, the total losses incurred among labor conscripts (dead, killed, missing, wounded, and taken prisoner – without any detailed specification) per month were as follows:

January 1943	19,284
February 1943	2,003
March 1943	651
April 1943	922
May 1943	235
June 1943	47
July 1943	20
August 1943	16
September 1943	30
October 1943	15
November 1943	44
December 1943	41

The total losses among labor conscripts in 1943 were 23,308, most of whom were taken prisoner by the Soviets in January 1943. Only a very small number of these survived to the end of the Second World War and were allowed to return home to Hungary.

The “liberation” of Hungary

There was a time in Hungarian history when mention of the village of Battonya near the Romanian border was almost synonymous with the “liberation” of the country by the Soviet Red Army. The claim that Battonya was the first “liberated” town in Hungary was put forward by various historical tracts and popular works and especially by the Battonya-born Frigyes Puja, holder of numerous party and state functions but most noteworthy as that of foreign minister (1973–1983). But these sources seem to have forgotten (or were perhaps made to forget) that the territory of Hungary in 1944 was not the same as that carved out by the peace treaties signed in Versailles on June 4, 1920, in the Great Trianon Palace and then again in Paris on February 10, 1947.

Words and statements uttered after 1945, and sometimes even today, almost completely ignore the borders that were established for Hungary between November 2, 1938, and April 1941. The territory of Hungary was then twice the size of both that established after Trianon and that of the present day, and the fighting within its borders did not begin in September 1944 near Battonya but had been going on since August 26, 1944, for it was on that date that Soviet soldiers first entered Hungary, in the valley of the Úz River in Transylvania. 

Even if Hungary’s present-day borders are taken into account, Battonya is still relegated in primacy as Soviet troops first occupied the village of Csanádpalota, followed by Királyhegyes, Nagylak, and Elek on September 24, 1944. In the event, the first two villages were briefly recaptured by German and Hungarian troops the next day only to fall conclusively to the Soviets together with Mako – the first Hungarian town – on September 26, 1944.

As for the last Hungarian settlement “liberated,” another discrepancy arises. For decades, when under Soviet rule, Hungary and Hungarians celebrated April 4 as the day of the country’s “liberation.” But why April 4 specifically? Because it was on that date, on April 4, 1945, that the Soviet news agency TASS reported that the Soviet Army had “liberated” the last settlement in Hungary – Nemesmedves – and fighting in the country had supposedly come to an end.

The facts, again, tell a different story. The fighting in Hungary actually ended on April 11/12, 1945, when Soviet forces captured the last localities in German and Hungarian hands – Magyarbüks (Magyarbükkös), Szentimretelep, the mountain village of Rábafüzes, and Dénes and the Kapuy estates near Pinkamindszent. True, the difference between the official and actual dates is “only” one week, but perhaps facts still have their place.

Regarding the death of the Soviet peace delegates

Finally, a few thoughts on the two Soviet peace delegates, subsequently immortalized in stone, who were supposedly murdered by the Germans on December 29, 1944, on the outskirts of Budapest.

For almost four decades, statues depicting Captain Miklós Steinmetz and Captain Ilya Afanasievich Ostapenko stood guard at the southwest and southeast entrances to Budapest. As was spoken about the statues at the time – their immense size served to epitomize the enormity of the Germans’ barbaric misdeed in – what was claimed at the time – their vile and underhanded murder of two Soviet peace delegates in clear violation of the international law of war.

After many years of research, however, Péter Gosztonyi, a historian living in Switzerland, was able to confirm that news reports about the murder of the two peace delegates, including film footage and photographs that were produced afterwards, were tricks of Soviet propaganda and that the death of neither of the delegates could be attributed to the German or Hungarian forces.    

Captain Ilya Ostapenko, having crossed the German lines with the terms of surrender and engaged in brief discussions, was sent back to the Soviet forces with an escort and subsequently fell victim to suspected Soviet mortar fire. Captain Miklós Steinmetz, on the other hand, never even reached the German and Hungarian lines, as his car struck a mine costing him his life. Nevertheless, his story so captured the artistic imagination that his “murder” at the hands of the Germans even appeared in a Hungarian feature film made in the 1950s.

So what really happened to Steinmetz? Here, the historian can rely on the entries made on December 28/29, 1944, in the notebook of Lieutenant Gyula Litteráti-Lootz, who was an eyewitness to Steinmetz’s death. He recorded the event briefly as follows: “Pestlőrinc [a southern district of Budapest]. Two guns positioned alongside the cemetery between Bélatelep and Miklóstelep [housing estates], beside the railway line on Üllői Road, and two more inside the brickworks. A.M. Some stupid Russian envoy drove his car over an anti-tank mine in the road. It exploded. Quiet day, ugly weather.”  

 It may be asked, what is the point of challenging minor facts that do not affect the overall course of events as perceived in the public imagination? I believe it is important because every minor event, every small occurrence, and every seemingly insignificant person may have a role in shaping “great moments” in history. There is an old saying that a historian should strive to present the past “without anger or favor,” not forgetting that though they may at times be wrong, they should, nevertheless, not knowingly “make mistakes.”

The death of the peace delegates: Josef Bader, 8th SS Cavalry Division

SS Scharführer [major] Josef Bader of the 8th SS “Florian Geyer” Cavalry Division was a witness to the events surrounding the death of Captain Ilya Ostapenko. As he notes: “By the end of the year, our frontline was right on the outskirts of Buda. It was then that the Russians made repeated calls through loudspeakers, requesting a ceasefire. They wanted to send some peace delegates over whom we were to receive and deal with according to the Geneva Convention. […] a small group of three soldiers with a large white flag appeared on the road from the enemy side and approached our positions with determined steps. My platoon commander then ordered me to approach the delegates, receive them, blindfold them, and lead them through our front lines.”

The Germans received the delegates, but the envelope addressed to the commander of the German forces defending Budapest was not accepted, and the delegates were sent back to the Soviet side. As Bader recalled: “My commander ordered me to escort the delegates back to no man’s land, where I had received them. We walked. But the closer we got to our front lines, the more intense the Russian shelling became. Our forward positions were being battered.

I suggested to the Russian captain that we should halt, take cover, and wait for the shelling to stop. I also said to him that I didn’t understand why his people were firing so heavily at our positions. They had to know their delegates hadn’t returned yet! But the captain said he had orders to return to his people as soon as possible. I ordered the group to stop, removed their blindfolds, and told them I had no intention of committing suicide; I would go no further! If they wanted to go further, let them!

I wished them good luck and let them continue on their way through no man’s land. I should point out that nobody on our side fired a shot. The ceasefire was complete – only the sounds of enemy shells could be heard. The little group set off. […]

When they had gone on about 50 meters, a shell struck them from the side. I threw myself flat on the ground. When I looked up, I could see only two soldiers walking on – the flag-bearer and an officer. The third lay motionless on the road. When, after a little while, the mortars fell silent and my men were tending to our own wounded, I rushed over to the Soviet officer, out of curiosity. 

I had hoped that he was just wounded and that we could help him. When I got alongside him, I saw that it was the captain. He had died instantly, having apparently taken a piece of shrapnel to the forehead.”  

Péter Gosztonyi, Magyarország a második világháborúban [Hungary in the Second World War], vol. 2 (Munich: HERP Verlag, 1984), 238–39.

Military terminology

If one browses publications on Hungary’s role in the Second World War or watches or listens to professional lectures and discussions, they will easily discern that there are certain things that are presented in different ways depending on who is speaking or writing about them. This brief section will address some of these discrepancies by presenting some incorrectly established terms and phrases and their correct forms of use. 

Perhaps the most commonly used such term is the “Hungarian Second Army,” which has been presented this way since the 1950s, instead of the correct form, which is the “Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army.” Naturally, one could argue that the latter form is simply too long, but then why wasn’t the “Hungarian Second Army” form used in the first place? This is, after all, the form that should be used and is used with the “German Second Army” and the “Soviet 25th Rifle Division,” for instance.

In the fall of 1944, an agreement was reached between the Hungarian and German governments regarding the formation of “Hungarian Waffen-SS” divisions. In the event, two divisions were formed and given consecutive numbered denotations in German – nos. 25 and 26 – and in Hungarian – nos. 1 and 2. However, they were also given additional distinguishing names in Hungarian, with the no. 25/no. 1 granted the title “Hunyadi” and the no. 26/no. 2 the title “Hungária.” In both cases, later writers often refer to these divisions as panzergrenadiers or as panzergrenadier divisions, although this is usually in reference to the “Hunyadi” division. Nevertheless, both divisions actually bore the moniker of an “SS Waffen-grenadier division,” e.g., the 25th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS “Hunyadi” (1st Hungarian) or, in Hungarian, “SS 25. (1. magyar) ‘Hunyadi’ fegyveres-gránátoshadosztálya”.

It is a common practice to refer to military personnel of the aviation and signals branches as “pilots” and “signallers,” although their correct designations are flight captain – not pilot – and signals lieutenant – not signaller. The point here is that, according to the terminology of the time, there were no pilots and signallers simpliciter; rather, there were flight personnel and signals personnel of various rank.

It has also become common practice to refer to the Chief of Staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd (usually written in lowercase during both the interwar period and during the Second World War) as simply the “chief of staff” – a practice that is quite wrong and incorrect. Every army, corps, division, and military command of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd had its own chief of staff, as did the Royal Hungarian Honvéd River Forces and the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Air Force. The chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd in its entirety, however, was always a singular post occupied by a single person. Similarly, his deputy – at one time, deputies – was the deputy chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd.

In the former Royal Hungarian Honvéd – and in military forces the world over – Roman and Arabic numerals were used to designate various armies and forces in strict order. Having numerical designations written out in long format was never done except by later historians who prefer writing “Hungarian Second Army,” for instance. But how should numerical designations be employed then?

In simple, general terms, Arabic numerals are used to denote armies, divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies, while Roman numerals are used when referring to corps and regimental battalions. Thus, for example, the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army, the Royal Hungarian VII Honvéd Corps, the Royal Hungarian 1st Honvéd Infantry Division, and the Royal Hungarian 9th “Dobó István” Honvéd Infantry Regiment, with the first battalion of the latter formation usually abbreviated as the 9/I Infantry Battalion, and so on. (The use of numbers underwent some changes between 1919 and 1945, but this was generally the standard format during the years of the Second World War.)  

Many people tend to use the narrow term “army” when they really mean “armed forces,” even though the former was and is, strictly speaking, merely the highest organized part of the “armed forces” or – in the case of Hungary during the Second World War – of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd. The latter, just like its more modern equivalent, the Magyar Honvédség or Hungarian Defense Forces, was greater than any individual army, of which three were created in the course of the organizational changes undertaken in the Hungarian military on March 1, 1940 – the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Honvéd armies.

Commencing July 29, 1941, generals’ (tábornoki) ranks in the Royal Hungarian Honvéd also underwent changes. The ranks of tábornok (brigadier general), altábornagy (major general), gyalogsági tábornok (lieutenant general of infantry), lovassági tábornok (lieutenant general of cavalry), tüzérségi tábornok (lieutenant general of artillery), and táborszernagy (lieutenant general quartermaster) used until that time were replaced as follows:

Tábornok	vezérőrnagy (one star)
Altábornagy	altábornagy (two stars)
Gyalogsági tábornok	vezérezredes (three stars)
Lovassági tábornok	vezérezredes (three stars)
Tüzérségi tábornok	vezérezredes (three stars)
Táborszernagy	vezérezredes (three stars)

A general ambiguity regarding the pre-July 29, 1941 ranking system was that anyone falling under the generals’ category could equally be addressed simply as “general,” whether a “three-star” lovassági tábornok or a “one-star” tábornok, since “general” was a collective category for all such officers. Starting on July 29, 1941, however, a more specific system of ranks was introduced, and accordingly, more specific forms of address. Unfortunately, it has become “fashionable” in today’s Hungarian armed forces to address certain officers as “generals” instead of using their correct and official ranks of dandártábornok, vezérőrnagy, altábornagy, vezérezredes, and so on. One would be hard-pressed to find another military force in the world where high-ranking officers are not addressed by their actual rank.

Starting on March 1, 1930, then-existing military units below corps level – infantry and hussar regiments, battalions of cyclists, and engineering battalions – were conferred with the names of historical personages. This practice was less common in the case of those army and corps units formed at a later date. Nevertheless, such was the case with the Royal Hungarian “Szent László” Honvéd Infantry Division, which was formed under this name in October 1944, although the decree ordering its establishment was issued before the Arrow Cross took power. The division went on to fight pitched battles against the Soviet Red Army before surrendering to the British at Deutschlandsberg, in Austria, on May 8, 1945.

(translated by John Puckett and Andrea Thürmer)