Hungary must stay out: From hoped-for neutrality to forced entry into war

At the outbreak of the German, Slovak, and later Soviet invasions of Poland, Hungary took a firm neutral position, as formulated at the Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting of September 10, 1939: “It was the unanimous opinion of His Excellency the Regent and those that spoke before him that, as the Hungarian government had already declared most decisively at the outbreak of the German-Polish War, it is a matter of national honor for Hungary not to participate in any military action against Poland.”

It was on the above basis that Hungary refused a German request – later repeated by the Slovaks – to allow German (and Slovak) military trains to use Hungarian railway lines. Many among the Hungarian military leadership believed that Hungary should stay out of the war, which was soon to unfold on a European-wide scale.

Brigadier General István Náday, deputy to the chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd, Major General Henrik Werth, in a memorandum dated September 5, 1939, precisely formulated the doubts and concerns that Hungary had to face. He wrote: “The Third Reich promised Hungary nothing, and I personally see the explanation for the polite acknowledgment of the Hungarian offer of assistance now as well as the failure to conclude a political and military treaty in 1938 in the fact that the German Reich does not want to assume any obligations toward us. Its advantageous position with respect to us is such that it is able to get what it wants from us without any promises. […] it is also incorrect that Hitler wants a strong Hungary because a strong Hungary is assertive whereas a weak Hungary is pliant. […] However, it is clear that we can only enter into armed action on the side of the Axis because our small army and weak military industry are entirely dependent on German – and to a lesser extent – Italian support.”  

At the end of this thorough and detailed discussion, Náday summarized what he thought Hungary should do as a result of the war having broken out:

“1. Monitor events calmly, be non-committal and unbiased, and refrain from isolated aggression.

2. Don’t let chivalry dictate risking everything for a potentially lost cause.

3. Strengthen our ties with Italy.

4. Maintain relations with the other side as long as possible.

5. Keep our forces intact as long as circumstances permit, and deploy them when they can achieve the greatest success at the least possible sacrifice or when it is absolutely necessary for the survival of the state.”

Lastly, István Náday expressed the natural position of a soldier when he wrote at the end of his note: “Even if foreign policy had a completely different stance and the army were to serve a different purpose, the above view would, of course, not affect the fulfillment of my duty in the slightest.”

The Hungarian government, led by Pál Teleki, identified with Náday’s position. On the one hand, it maintained diplomatic relations with the British and French governments, while on the other, it renewed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which was regarded as a German ally at the time, and an economic and political rapprochement began between the two countries, which was also reflected in similar ideas regarding Romania.

Reports of the Hungarian embassy in Moscow placed special emphasis on the development of Soviet-Romanian relations, which clearly indicated that the Soviet Union would sooner or later make territorial claims against Romania. This would occur in June 1940, when the communist state demanded Romania cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Romanians were given 24 hours to “respond.”

The Soviets rejected a Romanian proposal for negotiations and occupied the territories in question. The idea that the Soviet Union would have supported Hungarian territorial claims against Romania finds only partial support, however. The accredited Hungarian ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary József Kristóffy, made several references to how Soviet “promises” should be handled. In his report to Foreign Minister István Csáky on July 11, 1940, regarding the current state of Hungarian-Soviet relations, Kristóffy wrote that the Soviet Union harbored no territorial claims against Hungary and was interested in good neighborly relations. He added that the Soviet Union regarded Hungarian territorial claims against Romania as well-founded and would support them if brought forward at a peace conference. In the event of a possible Hungarian-Romanian conflict, the Soviet position would be as described. Moreover, he stated that the Soviet government was ready to conclude a trade agreement with Hungary. Kristóffy concluded his above report by saying:

“Regarding Premier Molotov’s statements, I would like to add as a final note that although the mood and intentions are currently good, it would present an unstable foundation to build on for the future. Soviet foreign policy lacks any moral basis and at any time may pivot in a direction contrary to the words or statements they have made, if Soviet interests thus require.”

Despite Kristóffy’s statement that “the Soviet Union harbored no territorial claims against Hungary,” the Hungarian embassy in Moscow indicated on several occasions that the Soviet annexation of Transcarpathia could not be ruled out, and an article published in the newspaper Komsomol appeared illustrated with a map showing Transcarpathia as part of the Soviet Union. (Soviet officers taken prisoner during the operations of the Royal Hungarian 2nd Honvéd Army in the summer of 1942 were also found to have maps on which Transcarpathia was depicted as part of the Soviet Union.)

Hungarian embassy staff also received information that Hungary would be the next target after Romania, and the embassy staff would soon be citizens of the same country as the informant, that is, the Soviet Union. Naturally, this information was treated appropriately, but it seemed clear to Hungarian foreign policy makers that the Soviets could only be trusted with reservations. 

Following the Soviet-Romanian conflict, Hungary became increasingly determined to resolve the territorial issue with Romania. During the months of July and August 1940, the possibility of an armed solution rose to prominence. The Hungarian prime minister, Count Pál Teleki, believed that the Hungarian-Romanian “feud” could only be resolved by armed force and that Hungary would have to be the one to resolve it.

The chief of the general staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd, Major General Henrik Werth, however, realized that the Royal Hungarian Honvéd would be incapable of recapturing the territory on its own by force of arms. The size, weaponry, and training of the Hungarian Honvéd were not yet at a level that would allow it to wage a successful war against the Romanian army. Teleki, however, believed that Hungary should avoid a unilateral commitment to the Axis powers – especially Germany – because it would eliminate what little room Hungary had left for maneuver.

The Hungarian-Romanian conflict was eventually resolved by peaceful means as German and Italian “recommendations” that proposed direct discussions between the parties could not be ignored. The Romanian-Hungarian talks in Szörényvár (Turnu-Severin) in August 1940, however, were inconclusive. In practical terms, Romania could only envisage a population exchange while Hungary wished to reacquire some 102,000 square kilometers of territory it had once owned. 

The solution was eventually found in the so-called Second Vienna Award, which elicited the greatest dissatisfaction on both sides. Hungary regained more than 43,000 square kilometers of its former territory, of which slightly more than half of the population – some 2.2 million people – were ethnic Hungarians. However, this still meant some 600,000 ethnic Hungarians of the former Hungarian territories “remained” within Romania.  

No one challenged the award decision. Britain, which was fighting a life-and-death struggle with Germany, did not raise the issue. Although the Soviet Union resented not being party to the resolution of the conflict between Hungary and Romania, this had little effect on Hungarian-Soviet relations at the time. The German-Italian arbitration, however, made Hungary even more “obligated” toward Germany. In the autumn of 1940, Hungary became the first country to join the Tripartite Pact, made concessions to the German minority in Hungary, and strengthened its economic ties with the German Reich.

The horizon darkens

Meanwhile, the ramifications of the German-Soviet pact took hold in Europe. Finland suffered defeat in the Winter War (November 1939 – March 1940) and was forced to cede territories claimed by the Soviet Union. Next, the three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – were annexed by the Soviet Union in the spring of 1940.

Even during this period, the Hungarian leadership consistently maintained their position that the country had to stay out of the present war. Hungary’s economic and military strength needed to be preserved so the country could act with sufficient force to achieve its revisionist aims once the current European conflict had ended – which was still viewed as a limited European war.

Prime Minister Pál Teleki argued that it was in Hungary’s fundamental interest to maintain diplomatic relations with powers outside the German-Italian axis and secure the country room for maneuver if necessary. Such a possibility could have existed in the South Slavic state – the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – although Hungarian revisionist aspirations were directed towards the south as well. However, such aspirations were intended to be realized by a “peaceful path” – first formulated by István Bethlen and later voiced by Gyula Gömbös.

The treaty of friendship concluded “between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” which was signed in Belgrade on December 12, 1940, by the foreign ministers of the two countries – Count István Csáky and Aleksandar Cincar-Marković – and “promulgated” by the Hungarian legislature as Act II of 1941 on February 28, 1941, could have played a decisive role in the development of Hungarian-South Slavic relations.

The treaty has been usually referred to – quite incorrectly – as a “treaty of eternal friendship,” despite the fact that all treaties of friendship concluded between two countries in that era began with the same formulation. Commenting on this treaty, the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, argued that it was a positive development if it contributed to independent foreign policies on the part of Hungary and Yugoslavia but an unfavorable one if it brought Yugoslavia closer to the Axis powers. 

The latter became a reality when representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia signed the accession to the Tripartite Pact in Vienna on March 25, 1941. However, by the time the signatories returned to Belgrade, the military coup of March 27, 1941, had already taken place, in which both the British Empire and the Soviet Union acquired “significant benefit.”

Following the military coup, it became clear to Germany that the “Yugoslav question” would have to be resolved by armed means – one in which Hungary should also play a role. On March 27, 1941, Hitler informed the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, Dömé Sztójay:

“He believes that the hour of revision has struck for Hungary in regards to Yugoslavia, and as such, it will be forced to act against Yugoslavia. Hitler informs His Excellency the Regent that he fully recognizes Hungary’s revisionist claims to the limit set by His Excellency himself. He also mentioned Bácska and Bánát by name. He [Hitler] is also aware that His Excellency’s heart is drawn toward the Adriatic and that Hungary needs a free port. Fiume [Rijeka] belongs to the Italians, but Hitler promises to use all his influence in this matter.” 

Following this “offer,” the Hungarian political and military leadership held numerous consultations with Hungarian delegations traveling to Germany and vice versa. In the end, Hungary’s leaders adopted the position that in the event of a planned German invasion, Hungary would take armed action against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia if certain conditions were met: if Yugoslavia were to break up into its constituent parts; if Hungarians living in the South Slavic state were under threat; or if a “political vacuum” were created. This was decided at a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council on April 1, 1941. In a note written in May 1945 by the Secretary-General of the Supreme Defense Council, then-Colonel of the General Staff Antal Náray, we can read – among other things – the following remark concerning the position adopted by the Hungarian Foreign Minister László Bárdossy in the spring of 1941:

“The gist of his speech was that we must make use of every opportunity to ease the liberation of our kinfolk living under foreign rule.  This consideration, consequently, would lend urgency to our actions. However, the Yugoslav-Hungarian friendship treaty, now concluded, makes it impossible for us to take any proactive or offensive actions, as this would hardly be defensible in the eyes of history. A second consideration, expressly required both by the guiding principle of Hungarian policy and by our own future, is that this in no wise should extend beyond the restorative liberation and reattachment of the thousand-year-old Hungarian land. Our military operations, therefore, cannot be extended to other Yugoslav (i.e., Croatian and Serbian) territories… Moreover, he warned that in the event of a British and American victory, Hungary would lose all the territory it had gained so far and would find itself in a more difficult situation than at Trianon. He also drew attention to the fact that Soviet Russia was not indifferent to Balkan matters.”   

The ministers and chief of the Honvéd general staff, who were present at the meeting, also expressed their opinions. Finally, the prime minister, Count Pál Teleki, put forward his position:

“The Anglo-Saxon powers today are the ones that, with their possession of the world’s oceans and continents with immeasurable wealth, remain masters of the situation in a great war. […] He cautioned against judging current events from a narrow perspective and arriving at decisions that would be irreparable in the eyes of the Anglo-Saxon and Allied powers and thus in terms of the end of the war. Under no circumstances should it be suggested that we restore the Hungarian south prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Nor should our military operations extend south of the ancient Drava-Danube line. […] We can also expect Russia to intervene to defend its interests in the Balkans.”

  At the end of the meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, the head of state, Miklós Horthy – according to Antal Náray's memoirs – declared:

“[He] could not embrace an unrestrained and premature military intervention, one that would be considered incorrect behavior by everyone and would exceed the bounds of Hungarian self-interest, that is, the liberation of our kinfolk and territories. He instructed the prime minister and the chief of the general staff to agree among themselves on the number of troops to be placed on standby and to submit to him an immediate course of action in light of events.”

Prime Minister Pál Teleki, acknowledging the head of state’s decision, sought to obtain information regarding the British Empire’s position. He subsequently received a message from London through the Hungarian ambassador, György Barcza, that Hungarian military action against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could result in a British declaration of war.

Teleki resolutely wished to avoid this, but seeing no way out of the situation – another possible success of the twenty-year revisionist policy but moral concerns over the friendship treaty – he took his own life on April 3, 1941. Three days later, on April 7, 1941, the British Empire severed diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Hungary but did not make a declaration of war at that time.

War between Germany and Yugoslavia seemed inevitable, despite the announced intention of the new Yugoslav government to maintain its accession to the Tripartite Pact. A very interesting development then proceeded as on April 5, 1941, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This Soviet move signaled a major reversal in the formerly almost untroubled German-Soviet relationship.

After Hungary allowed German Wehrmacht forces to pass through Hungary – thus allowing a German attack on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the north – the Yugoslav air force commenced attacking Hungarian settlements. Hungarian air defense units shot down several of the attacking planes, but there was no Hungarian retaliation otherwise. Actual Hungarian military operations began on April 11, 1941, when the South Slavic state ceased to exist under international law following the proclamation of an independent Croatia in Zagreb on April 10, 1941.

The mobilized forces of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army taking part in operations in the south were strictly forbidden to cross the borders of the former Kingdom of Hungary, being told they were not going forth to conquer but to reclaim the lost territories. An interesting conversation took place in Moscow at that time between the Hungarian ambassador, József Kristóffy, and the Soviet First Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky. As Vyshinsky explained:  

“The Soviet government does not approve of the Hungarian government’s actions for two reasons: 1. Because Hungary has attacked Yugoslavia barely four months after concluding a treaty of friendship, which has made a very bad impression on the Soviet government, and 2. Because Hungary could also find itself in a difficult situation, and it is generally known that Hungary also has national minorities.”

József Kristóffy gave a diplomatic response:

“Hungary has acted now little differently from how the Soviet Union acted in September 1939, when the Polish state was also showing signs of disintegration; the Soviet position at that time was that the Soviet Union was not waging war but was only hastening to protect the lives of its ethnic kin.”

Following the German-Yugoslav war, few doubted that the next target of the German Reich would be the Soviet Union, its former “ally and comrade-in-arms,” which had also been preparing for war since the fall of 1940.   

Hungary’s new prime minister, László Bárdossy, who retained his former position as foreign minister, was caught between the two great powers and tried to continue his predecessor, Pál Teleki’s “neutrality policy” under increasingly difficult conditions. The revisionist successes achieved with German and Italian, but mainly German, assistance required “recompense” in some form.

Hungary’s military and political leadership was little informed about German plans to attack the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, the development of which began in September 1940. When the plans were presented to Hitler in December of that same year, he firmly declared that Hungary should not be involved in any way. Members of the German military command, however, felt that Hungarian involvement was needed, if for no other reason than as a staging area for German forces.

On February 8, 1941, Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the German army, tried to persuade Hitler, saying: “Even if Hungary does not take part in military operations, it should at least agree to troop transports on its territory.” Hitler was not convinced by Halder’s arguments, however, as his view was that Hungary accepts “all German requests at the cost of corresponding political assurances.” The plan for Operation Barbarossa, amended on March 22, 1941, as Führer Directive No. 21, did not envision Hungarian participation in the war against the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the Hungarian military command, led by the chief of staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd, Major General Henrik Werth, believed that in the event of a German-Soviet conflict erupting in the near future, Hungary would have to take a firm stand. Therefore, on May 6, 1941, Werth wrote a memorandum to the prime minister and made recommendations for the government, having analyzed the changes that had taken place between 1938 and 1941 that were favorable to Hungary. He opined that future Hungarian foreign policy should not be defined by expansionism but by security and that the only guarantor of Hungarian security could be a close alliance with Germany.

Werth viewed Romania as militarily weakened and did not regard Slovakia as a serious military factor. He saw the two dominant powers in the region as Germany and the Soviet Union, between which – in his view – war was imminent, and it was in Hungary’s vital interest to side with Germany in this conflict.

The prime minister, László Bárdossy, replied to Werth on May 12, 1941, explaining that he should not anticipate events so much. The government should be given a free hand and wait for the Germans to contact it. Moreover, the question of a German-Hungarian political and military treaty of guaranteed assistance, as raised by Werth, “does not address the desirability of concluding such a treaty and whether the German Reich is even willing to enter into such a treaty with Hungary on the basis of reciprocity.” 

Werth found Bárdossy’s response unsatisfactory. Based on information leaked by the Germans, whether deliberate or accidental, he predicted that the outbreak of a German-Soviet war would occur within a few weeks. On June 14, 1941, he addressed another memorandum to László Bárdossy, the minister of foreign affairs, in which he explained in detail why Hungary should join the war on the German side:

“1. Because it is required to ensure the country’s territorial integrity as well as our state, social, and economic system;

2. Because for the sake of our future, it is of paramount interest that Russia’s proximity be reduced and moved away from our borders;

3. Because our Christian national worldview and our principled stance against Bolshevism, both in the past and in the present, oblige us to do so;

4. Because politically, we have permanently aligned ourselves with the Axis powers; and

5. Because our further national expansion depends on this.”

The chief of the general staff of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army also requested from László Bárdossy that “the government should immediately contact the German government and formally offer our voluntary participation in the German-Russian war.”

The text of Werth’s missive was discussed at an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers on June 14, 1941, and the opinion expressed was that in the event of an expected armed conflict between Germany and Russia, the Hungarian government did not wish to offer its assistance to the German government. At the same time, Bárdossy also formulated a set of recommendations to the chief of the Honvéd general staff, which he asked to be kept in mind when negotiating with the German military command.    

On June 19, 1941, a meeting took place in Budapest between Henrik Werth and German Colonel General Franz Halder. By this time, Werth had received almost certain information about the planned German attack. According to Halder, the German-Russian question would likely be settled by force of arms within the matter of about a week. They would have preferred if Hungary had secured the Carpathian line better, but it should not do anything now lest it alarm the Russians. He also advised that Hungary should prepare for the likelihood of the Russians crossing the Hungarian-Soviet border en masse as a result of German military operations. The Russians would have to be disarmed. The German military and political leadership did not initially envision Hungarian participation in the war, but did not discount the possibility of requesting it if necessary.

On June 22, 1941, the German Wehrmacht launched its attack on the Soviet Union. Two Romanian armies participated in the attack and were soon joined by Finnish, Slovak, and Italian forces. As an expression of solidarity, Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on June 23, 1941. However, Hungary managed to stay out of the war for only four days.

On June 27, 1941, in the wake of a Soviet air raid on Kassa (Košice) and the bombing of the Kőrösmező (Yasinya)-Budapest express train, the Kingdom of Hungary declared that “as a result of the attacks, a state of war has been established between Hungary and the Soviet Union.” The head of state of the Kingdom of Hungary, Regent Miklós Horthy, informed Adolf Hitler of Hungary’s decision in a letter dated June 28, 1941:

“In the spirit of solidarity, my government broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet-Russian government immediately after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, and when the Soviet-Russian air force made repeated duplicitous bombing raids on Hungarian territory, I declared that Hungary was in a state of war with Russia.”

(translated by John Puckett and Andrea Thürmer)